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I. INTRODUCTION
Forces at work in both public and private sectors may soon
change the way state and local political subdivisions tax financial
institutions. The market for financial services is changing dramati-
cally. Governments have expanded substantially the scope of activ-
ities in which financial depositories1 may engage. The competitive
* Partner, Davis Wright & Jones, Seattle, Washington. B.A. 1966, Stanford University;
J.D. 1969, Stanford University. Past chairman Washington State Bar Association Tax Sec-
tion; past chairman Committee on Banking and Savings Institutions of the American Bar
Association Tax Section.
** Associate, Davis Wright & Jones, Seattle, Washington. B.A. 1978, University of
Washington; J.D. 1981, University of Washington.
1. The terms "financial depository," "financial intermediary," "financial industry,"
and "financial institution" are used interchangeably in this Article to refer to an institution
that accepts deposits from the public and private sectors and lends the accumulated depos-
its to customers in the ordinary course of business.
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environment for financial activities also is changing as general bus-
iness corporations enter the financial services field, an area previ-
ously considered the exclusive domain of financial institutions. Fi-
nancial institutions have increasing opportunities for interstate
activity, which offers both risks and challenges. These changes
have occurred during a period in which the extensive framework of
state and federal governmental regulation and protection of finan-
cial activity has been curtailed substantially.
At the same time that financial institutions adjust to the
changing market for their services, state and local governments are
attempting to address increasing revenue needs. Although the
budget difficulties that state and local governments face are mainly
unrelated to the financial industry, the governments' financial cri-
sis is magnified by an inability to collect taxes traditionally paid by
financial depositories. Moreover, a series of Supreme Court and
state court decisions have restricted the ability of the states to tax
the principal or interest on federal obligations held by financial
depositories. 2
Partly because of the general fiscal crisis and partly because of
these court decisions, a number of states are searching for a revised
basis on which to tax financial institutions. State legislatures
should consider carefully the changing market forces affecting the
financial industry to determine the appropriate basis for taxation.
This Article examines the legal developments, both in financial in-
dustry regulation and in federal limitations on state taxation, that
have helped to shape the current market for financial services.
This analysis and a review of relevant tax policy issues suggest that
the states' interest in taxing the financial industry on a thorough
but rational basis will be served best by a state income tax on fi-
nancial institutions that is based on uniform jurisdictional rules
and uniform apportionment standards.
II. BACKGROUND: A REGULATED INDUSTRY
Historically, the banking industry has been regulated heavily.
The Federal Reserve Board, the Comptroller of the Currency, the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board, and other federal agencies, 3 as
2. First Nat'l Bank v. Bartow County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 105 S. Ct. 1516 (1985);
Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Dallas County, 463 U.S. 855 (1983); Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v.
Garner, 624 S.W.2d 551 (Tenn. 1981), rev'd 459 U.S. 392 (1983); see Blasi & Judson, Su-
preme Court Provides Guideline for Taxing of Federal Securities by States, 64 J. TAx'N 42
(1986).
3. Other federal agencies include the Federal National Mortgage Association, Federal
1058 [Vol. 39:1057
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well as comparable state agencies, have exercised considerable stat-
utory authority and administrative discretion in circumscribing the
activities in which financial institutions may engage. Each of these
agencies responded to a specific legislative mandate. Congress
charged the Federal Reserve Board with regulating bank holding
companies, restraining undue concentration of commercial banking
resources, operating a check or bank note clearance system, and
establishing and maintaining bank reserve and examination mech-
anisms.' The Comptroller of the Currency was directed to control
and regulate the national currency and to supervise national
banks.5 The Federal Home Loan Bank Board was directed to su-
pervise Federal Home Loan Banks.' Until recently these federal
regulatory schemes and the corresponding state schemes have re-
stricted the business operations of financial institutions both sub-
stantively and geographically.
A. A Regulatory History of Commercial Banks
The financial industry consists of several different types of
businesses. The most visible segment of the industry includes the
commercial banks, which operate in their permitted business
sphere either directly or through affiliates and subsidiaries. An-
other major segment of the industry consists of savings and loan
and other thrift institutions, including mutual savings banks. A
third segment is composed of investment banks, whose operations
typically are limited to underwriting, distributing, and trading se-
curities. Quasi-governmental entities-including the federal land
banks,1 intermediate credit banks,8 and others 9-make up a final
Land Banks, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, the Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation, Production Credit Associations, and the Import-Export Bank.
4. See Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. §§ 221-522 (1982).
5. National Banking Act, ch. 106, § 1, 13 Stat. 99 (1864) (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 21 (1982)).
6. Federal Home Loan Bank Act, ch. 522, § 17, 47 Stat. 736 (1932) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1437 (1982)).
7. See Federal Farm Loan Act, ch. 245, 39 Stat. 360 (1916), repealed by Farm Credit
Act of 1971, ch. 181, § 5.26(a), 85 Stat. 583, 624.
8. See Federal Farm Loan Act, ch. 245, tit. II, § 201(a) (1916), repealed by Farm
Credit Act of 1971, ch. 181, § 5.26(a), 85 Stat. 583, 624.
9. E.g., Farm Credit Administration, Federal Farm Loan Act amendments, ch. 25,
§ 40, 48 Stat. 41, 51, repealed by Farm Credit Act of 1971, ch. 181, § 5.26(a), 85 Stat. 583,
624; Federal Credit Unions, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1795 (1982); Production Credit Associations,
Farm Credit Act of 1933, ch. 98, 48 Stat. 257, repealed by Act of Sept. 6, 1966, ch. 554, §
8(a), 80 Stat. 378, 648.
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group within the financial industry.
Each segment of the industry historically has been subject to
heavy regulation.10 Prior to 1791 the banking industry largely was
unregulated. In that year Alexander Hamilton successfully per-
suaded Congress to charter the first Bank of the United States for
twenty years. The Bank of the United States participated in fi-
nancing the federal government's cash flow and in making loans to
the general public. It accepted deposits from both public and pri-
vate parties. In 1811 political forces1 combined in opposition to
continuing the Bank's charter, and the first Bank of the United
States was dissolved.
The nation's monetary situation deteriorated significantly
from 1811 to 1816. The lack of a central federal bank became a
critical problem because of the government's need to borrow heav-
ily to fund the War of 1812.12 In 1816, as a result of its financial
requirements, Congress determined to charter the second Bank of
the United States, again for a limited period of twenty years. In
1836, however, states' rights advocates, easy-money promoters, and
various proponents of private bank ownership found a powerful
ally in President Andrew Jackson, who vetoed the congressional
action that would have renewed the Bank's charter.1 s
The dissolution of the Bank of the United States left the char-
tering of financial institutions to state legislatures. In 1838 New
York adopted the Free Banking Act to regularize and bureaucra-
tize bank chartering and to depoliticize the chartering process. 4
Michigan adopted a similar law in 1937.'" During the next thirty
years, eighteen of the thirty-three state legislatures enacted legisla-
tion permitting the charter of state banks on a depoliticized
basis.' 6
Congress reintroduced a national banking system through the
National Banking Act of 1864.17 The legislation had two primary
10. This Article offers a brief regulatory history of the commercial banking industry.
For a more detailed examination of the relationship among various financial institution reg-
ulatory schemes, see Report of the President's Commission on Financial Structure and Reg-
ulation (the "Hunt Report"), December, 1971.
11. See H. WALGREN, PRINCIPLES OF BANK OPERATIONS, 321-323 (1975).
12. See Huertas, The Regulation of Financial Institutions: A Historical Perspective
on Current Issues, FINANCIAL SERVICES: THE CHANGING INSTITUTIONS AND GOVERNMENT POL-
icy, 8 (1983).
13. See H. WALGREN, supra note 11, at 322.
14. Act of April 13, 1938, ch. 684, 1938 N.Y. Laws 1763.
15. Act of July 28, 1937, no. 341, 1937 Mich. Pub. Acts 702.
16. See Huertas, supra note 12, at 11.
17. Tlie National Banking Act, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (1864) (codified as amended at 12
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objectives. The first goal was to finance the Civil War through sub-
stantial government borrowing. The Banking Act's second objec-
tive was to eliminate the myriad state bank paper money certifi-
cates in circulation, many of which were fraudulent. 8 The
National Banking Act contemplated the following three events: (1)
regularly issuing national currency with a consistent design; (2)
creating a network of national banks operating in compliance with
federal regulatory standards; and (3) requiring national banks to
maintain specified reserves.
Following the passage of the National Banking Act, the coun-
try had a dual banking system-a substantial number of small
banks created under state law, and a smaller number of relatively
larger banks created under the National Banking Act. In 1954
Congress attempted to eliminate the state component of the dual
banking system by levying a substantial tax on bank notes issued
by state banks. 9 The increased use of bank checks rather than
bank notes as a medium of exchange rendered this effort largely
ineffective. Consequently, the dual banking system survived con-
gressional attack and persists today.
The next substantial reform in the nation's banking system
was the passage of the Federal Reserve Act in 1913.0 The Act pro-
vided for partially centralized control of the commercial banking
industry through a system of regional Federal Reserve Banks, but
concentrated control of certain important national issues in the
Federal Reserve Board. The Federal Reserve Act did not try to
abolish the dual banking system. Instead, it gave state banks the
option of choosing to become members of the Federal Reserve
System.
The country's banking system was a major casualty of the eco-
nomic depression following the stock market crash of 1929. A large
number of the banks in the United States failed between 1929 and
1933.21 Congress enacted the Banking Act of 19332 and its sequel,
U.S.C. §§ 1-216(d) (1982)).
18. Walgren notes: "Nicholas' Bank Note Reporter, published in 1858, gave 5,400 sep-
arate descriptions of fraudulent notes in circulation. Only about 7,000 different kinds of
genuine notes were in use at the time." H. WALGRsN, supra note 11, at 324.
19. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 591-736, § 4881, 68A Stat. 587 (1954)
(repealed 1976).
20. Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 221-522 (1982)).
21. From 1930 to 1933 nearly 9,000 banks failed. H. WALGnEN, supra note 11, at 334.
22. The Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. §§ 1811-1832 (1982)).
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the Banking Act of 1935,23 in response to the banking crisis. The
1933 Banking Act created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion (FDIC) and required all Federal Reserve System member
banks to become participants in the FDIC system.24
Branching is another area of bank operations that legislatures
historically have restricted. The National Bank Act and most cor-
responding state legislative schemes prohibited either interstate or
intrastate branching by national and state banks.25 The McFadden
Act,26 which Congress enacted in 1927, permitted national banks to
branch within their domiciliary states, but only if local state law
permitted the branching. The McFadden Act permitted banks op-
erating branches at the time of its enactment to maintain those
branches under grandfathering provisions.
The McFadden Act did not entirely prohibit interstate
branching. The Act, however, required interstate branching to be
carried on through a bank holding company. A bank holding com-
pany is a corporation that, although not itself a bank, controls all
or a substantial majority of the shares of one or more banks lo-
cated within one state or in several states. A number of bank hold-
ing companies were created during flurries of holding company ac-
tivity in the 1900s, the 1920s, and the early 1950s.11
In 1956 the Bank Holding Company Act29 brought all bank
holding companies under the Federal Reserve Board's supervision.
The Act also restricted the activities in which multibank holding
companies could engage. Congress adopted this legislation partly
as a response to the activities of TransAmerica Corporation.
TransAmerica acted as a financial services holding company and
owned interests in banks, insurance companies, and related enti-
ties.30 Congress was concerned that TransAmerica would, in effect,-
monopolize the range of financial services, resulting in concentra-
tion of ownership of banking, insurance, stock brokerage, and other
23. The Banking Act of 1935, ch. 614, 49 Stat. 684 (1935) (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. §§ 1811-1832 (1982)).
24. Act of Sept. 21, 1950, ch. 967, § 4(b), 64 Stat. 875 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1814(b)
(1982)).
25. 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1982); see, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 30.40.010-.060 (1961 &
Supp. 1986).
26. McFadden Act, ch. 191, § 7, 44 Stat. 1225, 1228 (1927) (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 36 (1982)).
27. 12 U.S.C. § 36(a) (1982).
28. See H. WALGREN, supra note 11, at 335.
29. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (codified as amended at
12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1982)).
30. See Huertas, supra note 12, at 18.
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financial operations. The concern was exacerbated by the ability of
many holding company affiliates to branch on an interstate basis
without substantial regulation. The Bank Holding Company Act
prohibited interstate branching of bank holding company affiliates,
an area that federal law had not previously restricted. Section 3(d)
of the Act limited a holding company's right to acquire a bank
outside the holding company's domiciliary state to acquisitions
permitted by the laws of the state in which the target bank pri-
marily operated."1
The Bank Holding Company Act also limited multibank hold-
ing companies to activities that were "closely related" and "prop-
erly incidental" to the main activities of conducting a banking bus-
iness.3 2 Congress amended the Bank Holding Company Act in 1970
to bring one-bank holding companies under the Federal Reserve
Board's control. The amendments gave the Board broad authority
and discretion to interpret the "closely related" and "properly inci-
dental" language of the Holding Company Act of 1956.11 The 1970
amendments also directed the Board to weigh on a case-by-case
basis the positive consequences of bank consolidations, including
public convenience, necessity, and efficiency, against the undue in-
fluence attendant to concentration of banking assets.
B. The Expansion of the Banking Business
The financial industry quickly has taken advantage of the re-
laxed legislative constraints on the banking business. Banks have
substantially expanded their business opportunities by diversifying
the services they provide directly or through affiliates and by using
several devices to create or increase their interstate presence. The
regulations of the Federal Reserve Board3 4 and of the Comptroller
of the Currency" govern how bank holding companies and banks
permissibly can expand their business operations. The McFadden
Acts6 and the Bank Holding Company Act's Douglas Amendment
3 7
31. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240 § 7(d), 70 Stat. 133, 135 (also known
as the Douglas Amendment) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982)).
32. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982).
33. Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. 91-607, § 103(4), 84
Stat. 1760 (codified at 12 U.S.C. ] ]1843(c)(8)(G) (1982)).
34. 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.1-.43 (1986).
35. 12 C.F.R. §§ 5.30-.35 (1986).
36. McFadden Act, ch. 191, § 7, 44 Stat. 1225, 1228 (1927) (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 36 (1982)).
37. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, § 7(d), 70 Stat. 133, 135 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982)).
10631986]
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contain the rules governing interstate and intrastate branching for,
respectively, banks and bank holding company affiliates. The fi-
nancial industry has aggressively tested the limits of interstate ac-
tivities under these rules.
Case law and Federal Reserve and Comptroller regulations
have permitted banks, bank affiliates, or both to engage in leasing
businesses,"' to own commercial finance corporations, 39 to operate
credit unions,40 to operate certain computer services,41 to speculate
in futures markets,42 to deal in credit-related life insurance, 3 and
to engage in certain securities brokerage activities. 44 Banks or their
affiliates, acting through subsidiaries or through branch offices,
may conduct many of these activities on an interstate scale without
substantial limitation under state or federal law. Commercial
banks' direct interstate activities also have increased dramatically.
Loan production offices (LPOs) have been a major force in the
competition for major loan funding. In 1981, for example, the num-
ber of commercial bank LPOs located in states other than the
sponsoring bank's domiciliary state is estimated to have been
350. 4' Bank call officer programs are another major force in the
market for lending opportunities.46
38. M & M Leasing Corp. v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 563 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1977).
39. Gerber, Current Legal and Regulatory Developments, 3 NATIONAL BANKING REV.
259, 264 (1966).
40. Gerber, Current Legal and Regulatory Developments, 2 NATIONAL BANKING REV.
573, 576 (1965).
41. See National Retailers Corp. v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 604 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1979),
holding that a national bank can engage in computer service activity only to support activi-
ties expressly authorized by the National Banking Act. A national bank exceeded its powers
when it went beyond this limitation and offered data processing services to the public
generally.
42. Lehr, Current Legal and Regulatory Developments, 3 NATIONAL BANKING REV.
549, 551 (1966).
43. First Nat'l Bank v. Smith, 436 F. Supp. 824 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
44. See OCC Interpretive Letter (1977), [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] FED. BANKING L.
REP., (CCH) 1 85037 (promoting bank participation in treasury bill and GNMA mortgage
futures markets). In Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Comptroller of Currency, 758 F.2d 739 (D.C.
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 54 U.S.L.W. 3460 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1986), the court determined that a
national bank's operation of a securities brokerage subsidiary does not violate federal law,
but faces geographical limits in the McFadden Act's imposition of state law branch banking
restrictions on national banks.
45. Geographic Restrictions on Commercial Banking in the United States, Report of
the President of the United States at 6 (January 1981).
46. Call programs enable banks to provide loans to businesses across the country. "It
is not possible to estimate the magnitude of business generated by calling officers." Cohen,
Interstate Banking: Myth and Reality, 18 Loy. LAL. REV. 965, 973 (1985). Under a call
officer program, a bank targets potential borrowers in another state to receive the concerted
attention of one or more traveling loan officers. On large transactions this kind of call officer
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More recently, a flood of "nonbank banks" have entered the
financial market. 7 The Bank Holding Company Act defines a bank
as an institution that accepts demand deposits and makes com-
mercial loans.4" An institution that does not accept demand depos-
its or does not make commercial loans does not fall within the
Bank Holding Company Act's definition of a bank and thus is not
subject to the Act's interstate branching restrictions.
In 1984 the Federal Reserve Board adopted regulations that
expanded the regulatory definition of a bank to prohibit the inter-
state branching of nonbank banks.4 9 In Board of Governors v. Di-
mension Financial Corporation50 the Supreme Court struck down
the Board's regulatory efforts and ruled that only Congress has the
authority to change the definitions upon which banking regulation
is based. The decision permits nonbank banks to continue operat-
ing interstate branches, despite the Federal Reserve Board's at-
tempt to restrict this practice. Proposed federal legislation, how-
ever, would change the statutory treatment of nonbank banks.5 1
In addition to the approximately one hundred 52 nonbank or
limited-service banks that have sprung up in the United States,
nonfinancial commercial companies are using the nonbank bank
rules to set up large, nationwide financial empires. Sears, Roebuck
and Company, for example, owns the Greenwood Trust Company
of Greenwood, Delaware. Sears is using Greenwood Trust as a ve-
hicle for interstate distribution of the new Sears credit card, "Dis-
cover," a general purpose card similar to Visa or Mastercard. 53 The
J.C. Penney Company, Dreyfus Corporation, Dean Witter Finan-
program results in additional business for the lending institution. A large loan placed by a
call officer is a low-overhead loan which can be priced at an extremely attractive interest
level. Such a loan frequently will escape the attention of the taxing authorities of the state
where the borrower is domiciled, another factor contributing to the relatively attractive in-
terest rate.
47. Ellis, Nonbanks: Who's Getting the Bucks-and Who's Not, Bus. Wa., Feb. 10,
1986, at 67.
48. 12 U.S.C. § 1481(c) (1982).
49. Demand deposits were expanded to include any deposits that "as a matter of prac-
tice" were payable on demand. 12 C.F.R. § 225.2(a)(1)(A) (1986). Commercial loans were
expanded to include "the purchase of retail installment loans or commercial paper, certifi-
cates of deposit, bankers' acceptances, and similar money market instruments, the extension
of broker call loans, the sale of federal funds, and the deposit of interest-bearing funds." 12
C.F.R. § 225.2(a)(1)(B) (1986).
50. 54 U.S.L.W. 4101 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1986).
51. See H.R. 20, 99 Cong. 1st Sess. (1985) (changing the definition of a "bank" under
the Bank Holding Company Act).




cial Services, and many other commercial firms have undertaken
similar efforts.5 4
While the Supreme Court has struck down restrictions on the
interstate financial activities of nonbank banks, Congress and state
legislatures have permitted more traditional banking institutions
to conduct limited interstate activities and to acquire other institu-
tions within defined geographic areas. The northeastern states first
instituted regional interstate banking on a reciprocal basis.55 Some
state legislatures have adopted legislation that permits limited in-
terstate banking by allowing a bank headquartered outside the
state to acquire an in-state bank if the acquiring bank agrees to
limit its presence in the state.5 6 Some states have limited permissi-
ble interstate acquisitions to situations in which the local bank has
financial difficulty;57 other states have conditioned the interstate
acquisition on the acquiring bank's conducting commercial or in-
dustrial development activity in the target bank's state.5
The barriers once presented to a national, interstate banking
system have been eroded substantially. Under current law, a bank
or bank holding company can expand anywhere in the country by
using a nonbank bank, a loan production office, a subsidiary en-
gaged in a related financial business, or k call officer program. In
some regions of the country, interstate acquisition of commercial
banks is legal. It appears that interstate activity by financial insti-
tutions will continue to increase rather than decrease in the future.
The expanding scope and breadth of financial activity have
consequences for both the regulators and the banking industry.
State and local governments must make difficult decisions about
regulatory issues, including capital requirements, local qualifica-
tion, and registration for service of process. Legislatures also must
resolve the application of traditional banking rules in areas of com-
merce that the Uniform Commercial Code, consumer protection
acts, and other commercial legislation govern. Banks must make
numerous organizational decisions regarding the structure of their
operations in the expanded interstate markets. Banks must focus
54. Id.; see also Things to Watch, U.S. NEWS & WORLD RI
55. A history of the N.E. Banking Compact is found in Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v.
Board of Governors Fed. Reserve Sys., 105 S. Ct. 2545, 2548-49 (1985), in which the Court
held valid the statutes of the New England states authorizing interstate bank acquisitions
on a regional basis.
56. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5 § 803 (Supp. 1983).
57. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 30.04.230 (1986 Supp.).
58. D.C. City Council Bill 6-276, "D.C. Regional Interstate Banking Act of 1985."
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on the competition that surely will intensify both from within the
banking industry and from outside sources.
III. STATE TAXATION OF BANKS
The previous section describes the extent to which the federal
government traditionally has regulated financial institutions. Fed-
eral law also significantly has limited the ability of state and local
governments to tax financial institutions. These limitations, found
both in the United States Constitution and in federal legislation,
provide the legal framework within which a state may design a
scheme for taxing the financial industry.
A. Due Process Clause Limitations
Some limitations on state taxation of banks in general and na-
tional banks in particular derive from the due process clause of the
United States Constitution. Courts have eroded these limitations
substantially over the past two hundred years. Today, virtually any
regular and purposeful economic activity that a bank conducts
within the taxing state will satisfy due process requirements.
The Supreme Court interpreted current due process limita-
tions in National Geographic Society v. California Board of
Equalization.5 The Court stated that due process requires "some
definite link, some minimum connection, between [the State and]
the person . .. it seeks to tax."60 The Court did not accept the
more attenuated connection the California Supreme Court urged:
that the "slightest presence" of a taxpayer in the state should es-
tablish a sufficient nexus to support the imposition of a sales tax
collection and payment requirement.61 The Supreme Court noted
that its affirmation of the California court's decision did not imply
acceptance of the "slightest presence" standard.62
The Supreme Court's "minimum connection" due process test,
however, requires little more than the slightest presence in a par-
ticular jurisdiction. Courts have reduced the minimum connection
to its most basic elements. An entity conducting regular and pur-
poseful economic activity within a taxing jurisdiction permits the
jurisdiction to levy its tax on the entity. Modern case law in the
59. 430 U.S. 551 (1977).
60. Id. at 561 (quoting Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-345 (1954)).
61. National Geog. Soc'y v. State Bd. of Equalization, 16 Cal. 3rd 637, 547 P.2d 458,
462, 128 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1976) aff'd 430 U.S. 551 (1977).
62. 430 U.S. at 556.
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areas of jurisdictional due process6 3 and taxation due process indi-
cates that virtually any economic market penetration that is pur-
poseful and regular will satisfy the minimum connection required
under National Geographic.6
4
The required connection between the state and the taxpayer
has grown progressively more attenuated. Nearly three decades ago
in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co."5 the Supreme Court
considered California's jurisdiction over an out-of-state insurance
company that solicited insurance contracts by mail. The mail solic-
itation and the contract between the out-of-state insurer and the
California insured was the only aspect of the relationship that oc-
curred within California. The Court held that the contract's sub-
stantial connection with the state satisfied the requirements of due
process.66
Hanson v. Denckla,6 1 decided a year later, involved litigation
between Florida estate beneficiaries and the Delaware trustees of a
trust created outside the decedent's will. In considering whether a
Florida court had jurisdiction over a Delaware trustee with no dis-
cernable contact with the State of Florida, the Supreme Court
noted that technological progress and increased interstate activity
had increased demands for jurisdiction over nonresidents. The
Court, however, found essential for jurisdiction "some act by which
the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of con-
ducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the bene-
fits and protections of its laws." 68
The Supreme Court stated a similar standard in World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson.69 Under the World-Wide Volk-
swagen standard, a manufacturer's or distributor's attempts to
serve the forum state's market satisfies due process requirements.
Thus, if a corporation entered its products "into the stream of
commerce" flowing to the forum state's consumers, "personal juris-
63. Caselaw suggests that the jurisdictional due process test and the taxation due pro-
cess test are the same: "[T]he activities which establish [an entity's] 'presence' subject it
alike to taxation by the state and to suit to recover the tax." International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 321 (1945).
64. See, McCray, Overturning Bellas Hess: Due Process Considerations, 1985 B.Y.U.
L. REv. 265.
65. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
66. Id. at 223.
67. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
68. Id. at 253.
69. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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diction over the corporation would be possible." 70 The Court re-
cently further attenuated jurisdictional connection requirements in
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz.71 The Court held that a firm not
physically present in a state nevertheless may be subject to that
state's laws if the firm engages in commercial efforts "'purpose-
fully directed' toward residents" of the state.72
Under these Supreme Court formulations, states now easily
meet the due process standards for taxation. Commercial activities
that have been fairly regular and "purposefully directed" toward
residents of the taxing state will support jurisdiction over a nonres-
ident. The typical commercial activities of financial institutions in
a modern market normally will satisfy this jurisdictional test. The
mere physical presence in a state of a loan production office or of a
call officer who operates out of his home will provide the regular,
"purposefully directed" activities required by the due process
clause. The regular and purposeful exploitation of a market
through frequent mailings of credit card solicitations and place-
ment of credit card applications at commercial locations through-
out a state also may satisfy this test. Extension of computerized
banking services through automatic teller machines and other elec-
tronic funds transfer mechanisms, or through personal home com-
puters may satisfy the test. Regular solicitation of loan customers
through the mail or by telephone similarly may satisfy the due
process "purposeful activity" test.
When a financial institution conducts these interstate activi-
ties, its customer's state of residence offers the institution a signifi-
cant benefit-the right to sue the customer for nonperformance of
his obligations incident to the transaction with the financial insti-
tution. In most situations, a bank soliciting interstate business can
sue an individual customer only in his state of residence. Individ-
ual bank customers rarely have sufficient connections with other
states to support personal jurisdiction. 73
70. Id. at 297-298.
71. 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985).
72. Id. at 2177.
73. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 286; but see Proctor & Schwartz, Inc. v.
Cleveland Lumber Co., 323 A.2d 11 (Pa. 1974), in which a nonresident corporation con-
ducted extensive and active negotiations with a bank in the forum state. The Pennsylvania
court held that exercise of jurisdiction by the state court was "fair and reasonable" because
the nonresident corporation reasonably could have anticipated that failure to make install-
ment payments would result in consequences within the forum state.
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B. Commerce Clause Restrictions
Like the due process clause, the commerce clause of the
United States Constitution limits a state's power to tax. The Su-
preme Court stated the commerce clause test in Association of
Washington Stevedoring Cos. v. Department of Revenue:74 "The
Court repeatedly has sustained taxes that are applied to activity
with a substantial nexus with the State, that are fairly appor-
tioned, that do not discriminate against interstate activity, and
that are fairly related to the services provided by the State. '75 The
test's first and fourth elements involve an analysis similar to that
employed for due process clause purposes.7 The Supreme Court
strictly analyzes the test's third requirement, that the tax be non-
discriminatory; any remotely supportable suggestion that the tax
discriminates against interstate commerce will result in a repudia-
tion of the taxing scheme. 77 The Court, however, broadly construes
the requirement of fair apportionment. In Moorman Manufactur-
ing Co. v. Bair" the Court noted that the taxpayer has the burden
of proof in showing that the application of a particular apportion-
ment formula will lead to a distorted result and permitted the
state to apply a single-factor apportionment formula. The latitude
afforded the states in creating apportionment formulas and the
burden placed on the taxpayer of proving distortion have com-
bined to make virtually any apportionment formula constitution-
ally fair.
Thus, any purposeful interstate solicitation or market penetra-
tion activity that a financial institution regularly conducts appar-
ently will subject the institution to taxation in the jurisdictions in
which the activity takes place. States are free to levy nondiscrimi-
natory, fairly apportioned taxes on interstate activity. Both state
and federal courts have issued decisions consistent with this inter-
pretation. Notwithstanding the American Refrigerator cases, 79 the
74. 435 U.S. 734 (1978). That banking constituted "commerce" in the constitutional
sense, however, was not always certain. The Supreme Court in the Philadelphia Bank Case
held that banking is a line of commerce in the antitrust sense and that therefore bank merg-
ers are subject to Section 7 of the Clayton Act. United States v. Philadelphia National
Bank, 374 U.S. 321 at 356 (1963).
75. 435 U.S. at 750.
76. The Supreme Court initially set out these tests in their present form in Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
77. See Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638 (1984). But see National Can Corp. v.
Department of Rev., 105 Wash. 2d 327, 715 P.2d 327 (1986).
78. 437 U.S. 267 (1978).
79. See American Refrigerator Transit Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 395 P.2d 127
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rules' requires regular, purposeful activity directed toward a mar-
ket state. Deriving income from a state is not itself sufficient to
permit taxation. 1
C. Statutory Restrictions
Banks historically have been subject to state taxation only in
the state of their principal commercial domicile. The National
Bank Act of 186482 and successive legislation imposed comprehen-
sive restrictions on state and local taxation of national banks. In
1969, prompted by two Supreme Court decisions, 83 Congress en-
acted both a permanent and a temporary amendment to the bank-
ing laws that restricted taxation of national banks.84 The perma-
nent amendment went into effect in 197685 and made a state free
to tax any bank having a taxable nexus with the state, subject only
to the requirement of equal treatment of national and state banks.
Although legislators have attempted86 to restore federal regulation
regarding the taxation of financial institutions' interstate activities,
Congress has not yet adopted any proposal.
Aside from the specific statutory requirement of nondiscrimi-
natory taxation,87 few federal statutes currently restrict the power
of states to tax financial institutions. One federal statute, however,
restricts the states' ability to tax the interest or principal of federal
obligations. The statute provides:
Stocks and obligations of the United States Government are exempt from
taxation by a State or political subdivision of a State. The exemption applies
to each form of taxation that would require the obligation, the interest on the
obligation, or both, to be considered in computing the tax, except... a non-
discriminatory franchise tax or other nonproperty tax instead of a franchise
tax, imposed on a corporation; and ... an estate or inheritance tax.88
(Or. 1964); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. American Refrigerator Transit Co., 349 P.2d 746
(Okla. 1959); Commissioner v. Pacific Fruit Express Co., 296 S.W.2d 676 (Ark. 1956); Ken-
tucky Tax Comm'n v. American Refrigerator Transit Co., 294 S.W.2d 554 (Ky. 1956). But
see John H. Grace Co., (CCH) 1 206-416 (Cal. Bd. of Equalization, Oct. 28, 1980).
80. See Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Department of Rev., 419 U.S. 560 (1975).
81. 395 P.2d at 131.
82. National Banking Act, ch. 106, § 1, 13 Stat. 99 (1864) (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 21 (1982)).
83. First Agricultural Bank v. Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339 (1968); Dickenson v. First
Nat'l Bank, 393 U.S. 409 (1969).
84. Pub. L. No. 91-156, 83 Stat. 434 (1969).
85. State Taxation of Depositories Act, Pub. L. No. 93-100, § 7, 87 Stat. 342 (1973).
86. See S. 3368, 94 Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. 1900, 95 Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
87. Pub. L. No. 91-156, 83 Stat. 434 (1969).
88. 31 U.S.C. § 3124 (1982).
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The courts will permit neither a tax scheme that taxes interest
earned on federal obligations but not the interest earned on state
obligations,89 nor an income tax that includes the income from fed-
eral obligations in the tax base.90 Recent case law, however, has
enhanced the states' ability to include indirectly in the tax base
those sums whose direct inclusion is forbidden. First National
Bank of Atlanta v. Bartow County Board of Tax Assessors91 is
particularly significant in enabling state taxation of federal obliga-
tions. The Court upheld a Georgia shares tax that provided no di-
rect reduction or exemption from the shares tax base for federal
obligations. The Georgia Department of Revenue interpreted the
Georgia tax provisions to permit a proportional reduction of the
taxpayer's capital on a formula basis. The taxpayer's total capital
was multiplied by the proportion of the taxpayer's total assets held
in federal obligations. The Georgia scheme excludes the resulting
dollar amount from the tax base. The Court stated that this ap-
proach to determining the exempt portion of the tax base would do
''no more than allocate to tax-exempt values their 'just share of a
burden fairly imposed.' ",92 In light of this holding, states are free
to tax at least a portion of federal obligations that a bank holds.
States also may use some other approach, such as denying banks
deductions for income earned on federal obligations, which ordina-
rily would be available to a bank.93
Several states have adopted specific statutory limita-
tions-"negative jurisdiction" statutes-that restrict the state's
ability to tax interstate financial activities.9 4 Other state legisla-
tures have adopted taxing provisions affirmatively requiring that
the taxpayer have conducted a defined minimum of local business
activity before the state's authority to tax is established. These
laws are known as "affirmative jurisdiction" statutes. 5
California has adopted a statute that contains a negative juris-
89. Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Garner, 624 S.W.2d 551 (Tenn. 1981), rev'd, 459
U.S. 392 (1983).
90. Dale Nat. Bank v. Pennsylvania, 465 A.2d 965 (Pa. 1983).
91. 105 S. Ct. 1516 (1985).
92. Id. at 1521 (quoting Denman v. Slayton, 282 U.S. 514 at 519 (1931)).
93. See infra text accompanying notes 101-02.
94. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 11-24-6(f) (Supp. 1985); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE, tit. 15,
§ 20.620 (1984). Whether the Alaska provision has sufficient legislative authorization is
questionable.
95. Washington's business tax scheme, for example, is applicable only if a taxpayer is
"doing business" in the state. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 82.04.230-.290 (1982).
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diction test.9 6 Foreign banks that do not maintain a place of busi-
ness or conduct certain disqualifying business activities in the state
are exempt from state licensing requirements and from some taxes
otherwise imposed on banking institutions in the state. The out-of-
state banks must limit their activities to making and servicing
loans and to arranging security for the loans.9 7 This legislation re-
flects a clear policy decision. The statute's purpose is to encourage
bank lending activity that, absent some exemption from state taxa-
tion, might not be made available within the state. The effective-
ness of the jurisdictional statutes in promoting or discouraging
specific banking activity is not yet clear.
IV. POLICY QUESTIONS
The financial industry is in the process of expanding the scope
of its business operations. The current climate of relaxed regula-
tion and heightened competition permits and demands that banks
diversify the services they provide to the individual consumer and
the commercial marketplace. As a result, banks and their affiliates
are engaging in a wider range of business activities. Commercial
corporations also are expanding their activities in the financial
sphere and are competing effectively with the traditional bank and
its affiliated corporate group. Moreover, both banks and their affili-
ates and commercial corporations and their affiliates are expanding
their financial services across state lines. Interstate market pene-
tration by nonbank banks, by mail, telephone, television, and ra-
dio, and by computer networks soon will be commonplace.
These developments should lead both the states and their lo-
cal political subdivisions to address several important tax policy
issues as these governments consider reforming their schemes for
taxing the financial industry. Significant issues include the follow-
ing: (1) the proper jurisdictional standard, (2) the appropriate tax-
ing method or tax base for determining the financial institutions'
tax liability, and (3) the method for apportioning or allocating an
interstate financial depository's tax base among multiple jurisdic-
tions in which that bank may be taxed.
A. Jurisdictional Issues
Judicially determined due process and commerce clause stan-
dards bind a state or local political subdivision that seeks to tax
96. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 191(d) and 2104 (West 1977).
97. Id. § 191(d).
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interstate activity. In addition, issues of a proposed tax's equity, its
practicality, and its effect on economic development must be con-
sidered. From one perspective, a state's taxing all activity it is con-
stitutionally permitted to tax is a desirable tax goal. This tax strat-
egy protects local industry from the risk that out-of-state
competitors will have an unfair advantage in local markets because
they have no obligation to pay local taxes. This potential advan-
tage particularly concerns the financial industry, in which large
out-of-state banks frequently compete with local institutions for
loans to substantial borrowers. The out-of-state competitor fre-
quently lacks the benefits of a local office, individual representa-
tive, direct or indirect advertising, or regular market penetration.
In a competitive loan environment, in which a bid interest rate's
success or failure is measured by hundredths of a percentage point,
even a relatively minor tax on earnings from a large loan will place
the taxed financial institution at a significant disadvantage.
From another point of view, a state has a valid interest in not
taxing activity that is either too infrequent or too insubstantial to
constitute an appreciable local economic presence. Furthermore,
any taxing jurisdiction should strive not to exact a tariff whose
costs of taxpayer compliance or costs of audit confirmation exceed
the amount of additional tax revenues. Although modern computer
technology has substantially reduced the compliance costs for most
taxpayers,9 8 any filing response necessarily involves an appreciable
cost for both the taxpayer and the taxing authority. States should
keep the cost/benefit ratio of any taxing scheme in perspective.
A state legislature attempting to develop a taxing scheme for
the financial industry also should consider the type and extent of
the benefits the state extends to the financial industry. New York,
a money center state, extends different benefits than does Mon-
tana, a market state. New York provides the financial industry
with access to capital that can be lent to customers all over the
world. According to one estimate, for example, Citibank, headquar-
tered in New York, accrues over half its annual earnings on busi-
ness outside the United States.99 Montana, by comparison, pro-
vides financial institutions with a ready market for their lending
activities. Montana's farming, mining, and timber industries all re-
quire substantial borrowing, and the funds generated through sav-
98. See Westphal, The Computer's Role in Simplifying Compliance with State Taxa-
tion, 39 VAND. L. REv. 1099 (1986).
99. Table, Geographical Distribution of Revenue, 1984 Citicorp Annual Report.
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ings and other individual accounts in that sparsely populated state
are not likely to meet the demand for loan capital.
Because New York provides the financial industry with the
ability to raise lending capital, New York's establishing a jurisdic-
tional test that attributes to New York a substantial portion of the
income earning activities of banks with fund raising offices in that
state would be logical. If the primary benefit New York provides to
the financial industry is a source of funds, then New York should
design its jurisdictional test to insure that it taxes institutions that
derive economic benefit from that source of funds. Conversely,
Montana, as a market state, legitimately might establish a jurisdic-
tional test that allows it to tax financial institutions that regularly
and purposefully exploit Montana's market for their lending activi-
ties. Montana would direct its jurisdictional test specifically at
lending activity rather than at fund raising activity.
Changes in a particular state's economic climate may affect
the flow of loan dollars into that state. That a particular jurisdic-
tion's tax climate may affect the willingness of the financial indus-
try to engage in activities in that state is a frequent assumption.
Recently, several Japanese companies announced that the adop-
tion by some states of unitary tax schemes 00 will cause the Japa-
nese to invest in other states with tax regimes more favorable to
foreign-owned economic activity.10 1 In spite of assertions of this
kind, however, the question whether a particular state's tax cli-
mate does have a significant effect on industry's willingness to con-
duct business in the state remains open. A more accurate assess-
ment might be that industry tends to locate where it believes it
can make a profit and that general economic factors normally out-
100. Under a unitary tax scheme a tax, typically an income tax, is levied against all
members of a corporate group with interrelated business activities, rather than against one
member of the affiliated group which may have local activity in the taxing state. A unitary
group must therefore meet what have been called the "three unities test:" unity of owner-
ship, operation and use. Unity of ownership is shown by more than 50% ownership among
the corporate group. Unity of operation is demonstrated by central purchasing, advertising,
accounting, and legal departments. Unity of use is suggested by a centralized executive of-
fice and general system of operation. If a group of corporations meets these tests (and other
subtests developed by the courts) the group is said to be a unitary group. The income of all
members of the unitary group is then combined (and intercompany items eliminated) in
order to ascertain the tax base which the taxing state may reach. Apportionment is similarly
ascertained on a combined basis, although only apportionment factors of those members of
the unitary group which actually are subject to the tax jurisdiction of the particular state
may be utilized in ascertaining the apportionment formula under the standard three-factor
approach.
101. See Seattle Times, July 7, 1985, at D1; June 25, 1985, at A7; March 10, 1985, at
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weigh state tax considerations in business location and market
penetration decisions.
A state considering creation of a tax jurisdictional standard
also should take into account the state's need for steady revenue at
an adequate level. In an era of declining federal financial aid to
state and local governments and rising demand for state and local
services, each state has a serious need for revenue. A reduced or
minimum contacts jurisdictional test for nondomiciliary business
activity may help a state meet its revenue needs.
B. Nature of Tax Base
The financial industry is currently subject to several alterna-
tive and cumulative tax schemes. In some states the primary tax
on banks is the capital or shares tax.102 A shares tax levies on the
bank's capital. Local tax rules measure the shares tax by applying
a rate against the institution's capital. The tax at issue in First
National Bank of Atlanta"° was a bank shares tax. A shares tax
allows few exclusions or deductions from the tax base.
Although several states have adopted capital based tax
schemes, a capital base is unwise from a tax policy perspective.
First, the base is not economically elastic. Although a bank's capi-
tal will increase during good economic times, it will do so at a
lower rate than income or receipts. Correspondingly, a bank's capi-
tal will decline during poor economic times, but the rate of decline
will be relatively shallow. Because the tax base is not in harmony
with economic conditions, the tax will encourage or discourage spe-
cific activities. The tax therefore lacks desirable economic
neutrality.
Second, states using a capital tax may not be able to reach
certain bank assets, such as federal obligations, 14 and may find
that taxation of other assets, such as state and local obligations, is
politically unacceptable. Furthermore, a capital tax is an unwieldy
mechanism for attempting to tax the interstate activities of finan-
cial institutions. Attributing capital among a number of taxing ju-
risdictions on any reasoned basis is difficult. Frequently, states
simply regard all of a domiciliary institution's capital as taxable
102. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 6-5-10 to -17 (Burns 1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 47:
1967-1972 (West 1950 & Supp. 1986).
103. 105 S. Ct. 1516 (1983). For a further discussion of First National Bank of At-
lanta see supra text accompanying notes 91-94.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 89-94.
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and all of a nondomiciliary institution's capital as nontaxable. 0 5
Particularly in an age of expanding interstate financial activities,
this simplistic method is not acceptable.
Transactional taxes, such as document recordation taxes and
intangible property taxes, are not flexible enough to serve the de-
mands on a state tax system in an age of expanding interstate fi-
nancial activity. Transactional taxes trace the source of a particu-
lar transaction or a document to one state for tax purposes.
Resolution of the sourcing problem is arbitrary and results in an
all or nothing approach to taxation.
Sales taxes, use taxes, and gross receipts taxes, although useful
in consumer or industrial sales contexts, are not satisfactory in a
financial services context. These taxes are economically inelastic, 106
and the taxes often are attributed or allocated on an arbitrary, all
or nothing basis. Few states have opted for a gross receipts tax,
although the taxes are more popular at the local government
level. 0 7
The income tax does not suffer from these weaknesses. The
net income tax is flexible and provides a method for apportioning
taxable income among a number of taxing jurisdictions. The tax is
sufficiently elastic and responds to fluctuations in a state or na-
tional economic cycle. The net income tax is considered equitable
because, when imposed progressively, it responds to the taxpayer's
theoretical ability to pay. A state can tailor an income tax to ac-
complish economic goals. For example, legislatures can grant de-
ductions, timing benefits, and tax credits to encourage specifically
desired economic activity by financial institutions or other taxpay-
ers. A not insignificant advantage of an income tax is the tax ex-
pertise available from the federal income tax community and from
the numerous states that presently employ income taxes. s08 Col-
105. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 6-5-10-3 (Burns 1984), in which a "Bank Tax" is im-
posed on the deposits, shares, and surplus and profits of banks organized and operating
under the laws of the State of Indiana or under the laws of the United States and operating
in Indiana.
106. See Report of the 1982 Tax Advisory Council, State of Washington, February
1983 (regarding gross receipt taxes); Report on a Study of the Impact of Washington State
Taxes on New Business Creation, Peat, Marwick Mitchell & Co., January 1, 1985; Report of
the Tax Advisory Council, supra, at 15, (reporting that sales tax elasticity has varied widely
over the last three decades but is modestly inelastic over the long run).
107. See, e.g., Los Angeles, California Municipal Code, Article 1, Chapter 2 (4th Edi-
tion 1959); Seattle City Code, Chapter 45.44 (19 ). Only the State of Washington has a
full-fledged gross receipts tax. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 82.04 (1981). West Virginia is in the
process of eliminating its state gross receipts tax, W. VA. CODE § 11-13-2 (1983)
108. Forty-five states impose corporate income taxes. Two of these states, Alaska and
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lecting the tax is relatively inexpensive, and interstate associations,
such as the Multi-State Tax Commission,109 already exist to assist
the states in extending their income taxes to multistate business
entities. Both state taxing authorities and financial industry tax-
payers should prefer the imposition of an income tax.
State income taxation of federal obligations held by financial
institutions remains an area of uncertainty. The federal statute'10
provides that states may levy only nondiscriminatory franchise
taxes on interest or principal of federal obligations. Although the
elimination in the commerce clause context of the distinction be-
tween a franchise tax and an income tax is clear,"' it is less clear
that the distinction no longer exists for purposes of state taxation
of federal obligations. Courts constructed the distinction in the
commerce clause context; in the area of state taxation of federal
obligations, however, the statute mandates the distinction. Under
the analysis in First National Bank of Atlanta,"' however, states
may include federal interest in their tax base by denying otherwise
available deductions for some federal interest. The flexibility that
First National Bank of Atlanta affords states removes the histori-
cal pressure on state and local governments to tax the financial
industry with a franchise tax rather than with a direct income tax.
C. Apportionment Issues
The Multi-State Tax Compact" 3 (MTC) employs a three-fac-
tor formula that traditionally has been applied to the tax appor-
tionment for commercial corporations. The three-factor formula
consists of equally weighted sales, property, and payroll factors.
The MTC has been made expressly inapplicable to the financial
industry.1 4 Nevertheless, a three-factor formula similar to the
MTC formula, or a formula that embraces an additional deposits
factor, may provide the most appropriate means for apportioning
an institution's income among the states taxing the institution.
Florida, impose no personal income tax. Report of the 1982 Tax Advisory Council, supra
note 106, at 13.
109. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. §§ 305.655 (1983); WASH. REV. CODE § 82.56.010 (1983);
W. VA. CODE § 11-10A-1 (1983).
110. 12 U.S.C. § 548 (1982).
111. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
112. 105 S. Ct. 1521 (1985). For a discussion of First National Bank of Atlanta, see
supra text accompanying notes 91-94.
113. See supra, note 109.




The sales factor of the apportionment formula can be con-
verted easily to a receipts factor. California has mandated this con-
version in its regulations dealing with apportionment of bank in-
come. 115 The source of each receipts item must be identified to
provide the certainty necessary for any apportionment factor. The
California rules require this identification.
The apportionment formula's property factor must be modi-
fied for application to financial institutions to include an in-
tangibles element, which is contrary to the general approach of the
MTC. The source of the intangibles included within the factor
must be identified in a manner consistent with the identification of
sources for receipts factor purposes. The California rules demand
this consistency.118 Identifying the source of a financial institu-
tion's payroll will be similar in extent and fashion to payroll source
identification in a commercial company.
The final factor, which reflects the bank's deposits, would be
unique to taxation of financial institutions. Deposits are the foun-
dation on which a financial institution conducts its economic activ-
ity. No bank can make a loan unless it takes in sufficient funds
through deposits or other sources to fund that loan. Banks direct a
large portion of their advertising budgets and general promotional
activities toward raising or maintaining deposits. Because of the
significance that deposits have in a bank's operations, a deposits
factor in an apportionment formula for application to the financial
industry should be seriously considered.11 7
V. CONCLUSION
The states must review and revise their methods of taxing the
financial industry."8 Many states currently employ taxing schemes
that neither reflect the economic realities of the financial industry
nor take advantage of current legal doctrine on state taxation of
multijurisdictional taxpayers. Reasons for the states' failure to up-
date their tax systems are understandable. In times of budgetary
constraints most states are pressed to maintain and enforce their
present tax schemes. Rarely do states have sufficient resources to
expand those schemes in imaginative and economically rational
115. California Franchise Tax Regulation § 25137-4(c)(2) (1985).
116. Id. at § (c)(1).
117. New York's newly adopted tax system encompasses a deposits factor in its appor-
tionment formula. 1985 N.Y. LAws 3434.




ways to tax the rapidly changing financial industry. By contrast,
financial institutions have large tax staffs responsible not only for
compliance with state and local tax rules, but also for minimizing
their employers' administrative reporting burdens and total tax ex-
penditures. For example, Bank of America alone has almost half as
many tax staffers as Washington State's Department of Revenue
has audit personnel. 119 Furthermore, the inability of state taxing
authorities to compensate their employees at levels generally com-
parable to pay scales in the financial industry creates an additional
disparity in resources.
In light of this disparity in resources, states cannot be ex-
pected to be able to react to changing tax concepts as swiftly or
skillfully as the financial industry reacts. Each state, however,
should seek to tax each financial institution conducting activity
within its borders to the extent required and permitted by law.
The states simply cannot achieve this goal unless they grant the
authority to establish uniform rules regarding state taxation of fi-
nancial depositories to some central representational organization
or to the federal government. The states will realize only a percent-
age of the financial industry tax revenues available to them unless
an interstate agency like the Multi-State Tax Commission or a fed-
erally created agency like the Advisory Commission on Intergov-
ernmental Relations'20 imposes a tax scheme with uniform jurisdic-
tional rules and apportionment standards.
Because large financial institutions control resources sufficient
to respond imaginatively and effectively to any state-imposed tax,
these businesses are relatively indifferent to whether state taxation
of interstate activity is uniform. States, however, have neither the
resources nor the disposition to conduct the same level of effective
tax planning. Therefore, the ultimate benefits of a unified local
tax planning effort would inure to the states, not to business. Only
by agreeing to surrender a limited share of their taxing sovereignty
will the states be able to tax the modern financial industry
effectively.
119. The Washington Department of Revenue has approximately 170 auditors; the
Bank of America has approximately 71 tax personnel. Interviews with John Olson, Chief of
Audit Division, Washington State Department of Revenue, and Phillip M. Plant, Assistant
Tax Counsel, Bank of America.
120. In 1974, Congress commissioned the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations (ACIR) to make a study of all pertinent matters that related to state "doing busi-
ness" taxes on out of state depositories. Pub. L. No. 94-222, 90 Stat. 297 (1974). The ACIR's
report is found in State and Local "Doing Business" taxes on Out-of-State Financial Depos-
itories - Report of ACIR (May 1975).
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